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This paper builds a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms that explains why
international trade induces reallocations of resources among firms in an industry. The paper shows how
the exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market (while some
less productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market) and will simultaneously force
the least productive firms to exit. It then shows how further increases in the industry's exposure to trade
lead to additional inter-firm reallocations towards more productive firms. These phenomena have been
empirically documented but can not be explained by current general equilibrium trade models, because
they rely on a representative firm framework. The paper also shows how the aggregate industry
productivity growth generated by the reallocations contributes to a welfare gain, thus highlighting a
benefit from trade that has not been examined theoretically before. The paper adapts Hopenhayn's (1992a)
dynamic industry model to monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium setting. In so doing, the
paper provides an extension of Krugman's (1980) trade model that incorporates firm level productivity
differences. Firms with different productivity levels coexist in an industry because each firm faces initial
uncertainty concerning its productivity before making an irreversible investment to enter the industry.
Entry into the export market is also costly, but the firm's decision to export occurs after it gains








Recent empirical research using longitudinal plant or ￿rm-level data in several countries has over-
whelmingly substantiated the existence of large and persistent productivity diﬀerences among es-
tablishments in the same narrowly de￿ned industries. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998)
summarize this research by concluding that ￿... within sector diﬀerences dwarf between sector
diﬀerences in behavior.￿ In related work, Haltiwanger (1997, Table 1) reports that 4-digit industry
eﬀe c t se x p l a i nl e s st h a n1 0p e r c e n to ft h eo v e r a l lv a r i a t i o ni nt h eg r o w t hr a t e so fo u t p u t ,e m -
ployment, capital stocks, and productivity across establishments in the U.S. from 1977 to 1987.
Complementing this evidence on the extent of within sector heterogeneity, other studies have shown
that the bulk of resource reallocations across ￿rms remains internal to the speci￿c sector. Davis
and Haltiwanger (1999) summarize this evidence for the U.S. and report that less than 1 in 10 job
reallocations re￿ect employment shifts across sectors. Levinsohn (1999) reports similar numbers for
most industries in Chile following wide-reaching trade liberalization. Evidence reported in Roberts
and Tybout (1996) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) con￿rms that these patterns are not speci￿c
to the U.S. and that substantial within sector reallocations between heterogeneous ￿rms are also
prevalent in developing countries.
If these large intra-industry reallocations were unrelated to the heterogeneous characteristics of
￿rms, then their separate existence would not necessarily make them important determining factors
of industry performance. On the other hand, if the reallocations are related to ￿rm characteristics,
then the nature of the link between the two signi￿cantly aﬀects several important aspects of industry
performance. Although the analysis of this link between ￿rm characteristics and industry evolution
is an ongoing research program, enough evidence has been collected to demonstrate its existence and
relevance for industry performance. The main ￿rm characteristic found to be empirically linked to
intra-industry reallocations is ￿rm productivity.1 The strongest evidence of this link pertains to ￿rm
entry and exit decisions. Productivity diﬀerences between entering and exiting ￿rms signi￿cantly
contribute to aggregate industry productivity changes over time. Additionally, a large number of
studies have documented a strong correlation between ￿rm exit and low productivity (￿rm age
is also correlated with exit: younger ￿rms have disproportionately high failure rates). Finally,
some studies have also found evidence that reallocations unrelated to entry and exit contribute to
1Firm age and capital vintage are other important explanatory characteristics that have been highlighted in some
studies, although their impact may be limited to their eﬀect on productivity.
1industry productivity growth by redistributing market shares among incumbent ￿rms.2 A similar
reallocation process has also been studied at a higher level of aggregation: Basu and Fernald
(1997) ￿nd that U.S. aggregate productivity changes across the business cycle are partly driven
by expenditure reallocations across sectors with diﬀerent average productivity levels. The inherent
inability of representative ￿rm industry models to explain the contribution of reallocations to
industry performance has prompted the development of a theoretical literature of industry dynamics
that emphasizes the role of ￿rm level heterogeneity. This literature, along with the previously
mentioned empirical evidence, is reviewed in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) and Tybout
(2002).
This paper adapts one of these recent industry models with heterogeneous ￿rms in order to an-
alyze the role of international trade as a catalyst for inter-￿rm reallocations within an industry. It
then describes how these reallocations aﬀect both industry performance and welfare. The business
press often assumes the existence of this catalyst role of trade when describing how exposure to
trade has both enhanced the growth opportunities of some ￿rms while simultaneously contribut-
ing to the downfall or ￿downsizing￿ of other ￿rms in the same industry. Similarly, protection from
trade is reported to shelter ineﬃcient ￿rms. Rigorous empirical work has recently corroborated this
anecdotal evidence. Bernard and Jensen (1999a) (for the U.S.), Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) (for
Taiwan), and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) (for Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco) all ￿nd evi-
dence that the causation of the correlation between ￿rm productivity and export status runs from
t h ef o r m e rt ot h el a t t e r :m o r ep r o d u c t i v e￿rms self-select into the export market. Aw, Chung and
Roberts (2000) also ￿nd evidence suggesting that exposure to trade forces the least productive ￿rms
to exit the industry (￿rms with higher productivity levels relative to the incumbent average exit
after the exposure to trade). Both of these selection eﬀects (into the export market and out of the
industry) obviously reallocate market shares from less productive ￿r m s( w h oe x i t )t om o r ep r o d u c -
tive ones (who export) and therefore contribute to industry productivity growth.3 Pavcnik (2002)
directly looks at the contribution of market share reallocations to sectoral productivity growth
following trade liberalization in Chile. She ￿nds that these reallocations signi￿cantly contribute to
productivity growth in the tradable sectors. In a related study, Bernard and Jensen (1999b) ￿nd
that within-sector market share reallocations towards more productive exporting plants accounts
2The importance of this phenomenon varies across studies and is cyclically sensitive (see Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (1998))
3Forces other than trade also aﬀect the reallocation of resources within an industry. Olley and Pakes (1996) ￿nd
that deregulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry increased productivity predominantly through this channel
rather than through intra-￿rm productivity gains.
2for 20% of U.S. manufacturing productivity growth.
By relying on a representative ￿rm framework (at least at the level of the industry), general
equilibrium trade models have largely ignored these intra-industry reallocations and focused instead
on other consequences of trade, such as inter-industry reallocations or phenomena aﬀecting all ￿rms
in similar ways.4 This paper attempts to ￿ll this gap by providing a general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous ￿rms that explains how trade induces these selection eﬀects and intra-industry
reallocations. This model shows how exposure to trade will induce only the more productive ￿rms
to enter the export markets (while some less productive ￿rms continue to produce only for the
domestic market) and will simultaneously force the least productive ￿rms to exit. The paper then
shows how further increases in the industry￿s exposure to trade (driven either by trade liberalization
or the addition of new trading partners) lead to additional inter-￿rm reallocations towards more
productive ￿rms. The model thus explains how trade can generate industry productivity growth
without necessarily aﬀecting intra-￿rm eﬃciency. It also provides a theoretical foundation for
the recent empirical ￿ndings described above and rigorously shows how trade can contribute to
the Darwinian evolution of industries ￿ forcing the least eﬃcient ￿rms to contract or exit while
promoting the growth and success of the more eﬃcient ones.
Another recent paper by Bernard, Eaton, Jenson and Kortum (2000) also introduces ￿rm-level
heterogeneity into a model of trade by adapting a Ricardian model to ￿rm-speci￿cc o m p a r a t i v e
advantage. Both papers predict the same basic kinds of trade-induced reallocations, although the
channels and motivations behind these reallocations vary. In addition, Bernard et al. (2000) show
how their model can be calibrated to provide a good ￿tt oac o m b i n a t i o no fm i c r oa n dm a c r oU S
data patterns. However, subsequent work by Brooks (2001) has shown that this feature is not
robust across countries. The current paper relies on the previously documented empirical micro
patterns and focuses on the theoretical explanations and motivations behind these patterns.
4This last category includes models that assume a direct link between trade and ￿rm level eﬃciency. In these
models, exposure to trade typically increases the eﬃciency level of all ￿rms through a variety of channels: learning
eﬀects, increased scale of production, increased innovation, higher quality or diversity of intermediate inputs, reduction
of agency problems between owners and managers. Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999a)
speci￿cally test whether new exporting ￿r m sb e c o m em o r ee ﬃcient. Neither of these studies ￿nds evidence supporting
this hypothesis. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) test and reject the hypothesis that increased productivity in Mexico￿s
growing export industries was driven by increases in the scale of plant production.
32 Model Background
Incorporating heterogeneity in a dynamic industry setting, where forward looking ￿rms make entry
and export decisions, necessarily increases the technical complexity of this model vis-a-vis its rep-
resentative ￿rm counterparts. In order to reduce this additional complexity, I abstract from some
of the ￿rm-level dynamic stochastic processes that are typically modeled in the recent industry
dynamics literature, while preserving the necessary components that explain how certain charac-
teristics of industries shape their endogenous composition with heterogeneous ￿rms. The main
forces explaining the impact of trade on an industry are nevertheless quite intuitive. The opening
of new export markets exclusively bene￿ts the more eﬃcient ￿rms, as entry into these markets is
costly and can only be aﬀorded by the more eﬃcient ￿rms (who earn higher pro￿ts).
This model builds upon Krugman￿s (1980) analysis of trade in the presence of product diﬀeren-
tiation, increasing returns, and monopolistic competition, by incorporating ￿rm level productivity
diﬀerences. Given the diﬀerentiation of goods, these productivity diﬀerences may re￿ect more than
just cost diﬀerences among products yielding the same utility. Higher productivity can also be
interpreted as producing a better product (generating higher utility) at equal cost. The model
draws heavily from Hopenhayn￿s (1992a,1 9 9 2 b) work on ￿rm and industry productivity dynamics
to explain the endogenous selection of heterogeneous ￿r m si na ni n d u s t r y . I n s t e a do fa s s u m i n g
some immutable and innate ordering of ￿rms from most to least productive, Hopenhayn derives
the equilibrium distribution of ￿rm productivity from the pro￿t maximizing decisions of initially
identical ￿rms who are uncertain of their initial and future productivity.5 This paper adapts his
model to a monopolistically competitive industry (Hopenhayn only considers competitive ￿rms) in
a general equilibrium setting.6 Although the current model preserves the initial ￿rm uncertainty
over productivity and also the endogenous, forward looking, ￿rm entry decision, it greatly simpli￿es
5As was previously mentioned, one of the robust empirical patterns emerging from recent industry studies is that
new entrants are much more likely to have lower productivity and exit than do older incumbents. This evidence
con￿icts with the notion that ￿rm productivity diﬀerences are ￿innate￿ and known to ￿rms prior to entry. It rather
suggests that uncertainty concerning productivity is an important feature that explains the behavior of prospective
and new entrants.
6Montagna (1995) also adapts Hopenhayn￿s model to a monopolistic competition environment (in a partial equi-
librium setting), but con￿nes the analysis to a static equilibrium with no entry or exit and further constrains the
distribution of ￿rm productivity levels to be uniform. Unfortunately, the relevance of her work is diﬃcult to assess
because a questionable formulation of equilibrium is used. In the derived equilibrium, all ￿rms produce for one period
￿ regardless of their productivity. Although it is assumed that only the more productive ￿rms earning positive pro￿ts
remain in the industry in future periods, the present value of these pro￿ts ￿o w sd o e sn o te n t e ri n t ot h e￿rms￿ entry
decision. This renders the magnitude of the entry cost inconsequential to the derived equilibrium. This equilibrium
therefore does not respond to changes in the entry cost while being overly sensitive to the magnitude of the losses
incurred by ￿rms who exit the industry.
4the ensuing ￿rm productivity dynamics. Hopenhayn shows how these dynamics shape the equi-
librium distribution of ￿rm productivity and analyzes the impact of these dynamics on ￿rm value
and the performance of cohorts of ￿r m so v e rt i m e . M ym o d e lf o r e g o e st h i st y p eo fa n a l y s i sa n d
i n s t e a dr e l i e so nt h ec h o i c eo fas u i t a b l ed i s t r i b u t i o no fi n i t i a l￿rm productivity levels in order to
generate a realistic shape for the equilibrium distribution of ￿rm productivity. The bene￿to ft h i s
simpli￿cation is a gain in the tractability of the model that permits a detailed analysis of the impact
of trade on both aggregate industry performance and the relative performance of diﬀerent types
of ￿rms (indexed by productivity). As in Hopenhayn (1992b), I restrict the equilibrium analysis
to equilibria that maintain a stable aggregate industry environment over time. Forward looking
￿rms correctly anticipate this aggregate environment when making all decisions (including entry).
As the impact of any ￿rm on the industry is assumed to be negligible, the equilibrium preserves
a stable aggregate environment even though the fortunes of individual ￿rms change, generating
simultaneous entry and exit.
3S e t u p o f t h e M o d e l
Demand
The preferences of a representative consumer are given by a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum







T h em e a s u r eo ft h es e tΩ will represent the mass (or alternatively, the number) of available goods.
These goods will be substitutes, implying 0 < ρ < 1 and an elasticity of substitution between
any two goods of σ = 1
1−ρ > 1. As was originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), consumer
behavior can be modeled by considering the set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good Q ≡ U























where R = PQ=
R
ω∈Ω r(ω) dω denotes aggregate expenditure.
Production
There is a continuum of ￿rms, each choosing to produce a diﬀerent variety ω. Production requires
only one factor, labor, which is inelastically supplied at its aggregate level L (which also indexes
the size of the economy). Firm technology is represented by a cost function that exhibits constant
marginal cost with a ￿xed overhead cost. Labor used is thus a linear function of output q:




All ￿rms share the same ￿xed cost f>0 but have diﬀerent productivity levels indexed by ϕ > 0.
Regardless of its productivity, each ￿rm faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity σ
and thus chooses the same pro￿t maximizing markup equal to σ
σ−1 = 1










where r(ϕ)i s￿rm revenue and
r(ϕ)
σ is variable pro￿t. r(ϕ) (and hence π(ϕ)) also depend on the





(Pρϕ)σ−1 − f. (5)


















In summary, a more productive ￿rm (higher ϕ) will be bigger (larger output and revenues), charge
a lower price, and earn higher pro￿ts than a less productive ￿rm.
Aggregation
An equilibrium will be characterized by a mass M of ￿rms (and hence M goods) and a distribution
￿(ϕ) of productivity levels over a subset of (0,∞). In such an equilibrium, the aggregate price P








Using the pricing rule (3), this can be written
P = M
1







￿ ϕ is a weighted average of the ￿rm productivity levels ϕ and is independent of the number
of ￿rms M.7 These weights re￿ect the relative output shares of ￿rms with diﬀerent productivity
levels.8 ￿ ϕ also represents aggregate productivity because it completely summarizes the information
in the distribution of productivity levels ￿(ϕ) relevant for all aggregate variables (see appendix):
P = M
1
1−σp(￿ ϕ),R = PQ= Mr(￿ ϕ),
Q = M1/ρq(￿ ϕ), Π = Mπ(￿ ϕ),
where R =
R ∞
0 r(ϕ)M￿(ϕ)dϕ and Π =
R ∞
0 π(ϕ)M￿(ϕ)dϕ represent aggregate revenue (or expen-
diture) and pro￿t. Thus, an industry comprised of M ￿rms with any distribution of productivity
levels ￿(ϕ) that yields the same average productivity level ￿ ϕ will also induce the same aggregate












q(￿ ϕ) ￿(ϕ) dϕ
i−1
.￿ ϕ is therefore the weighted
harmonic mean of the ϕ￿s where the weights
q(ϕ)
q(￿ ϕ) index the ￿rms￿ relative output shares.
7outcome as an industry with M representative ￿rms sharing the same productivity level ϕ =￿ ϕ.
This variable will be alternatively referred to as aggregate or average productivity. Further note
that ﬂ r = R
M and ﬂ π = Π
M represent both the average revenue and pro￿tp e r￿rm as well as the
revenue and pro￿t level of the ￿rm with average productivity level ϕ =￿ ϕ.
4F i r m E n t r y a n d E x i t
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the industry. Prior to entry, ￿rms
are identical. To enter, ￿rms must ￿rst make an initial investment, modeled as a ￿xed entry cost
fe > 0 (measured in units of labor), which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their initial pro-
ductivity parameter ϕ from a common distribution g(ϕ).9 g(ϕ) has positive support over (0,∞)
and has a continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ). The absence of an upper bound on produc-
tivity is assumed only for simplicity; an upper bound can be incorporated in the analysis without
qualitatively changing any of the main results.
Upon entry with a low productivity draw, a ￿rm may decide to immediately exit and not
produce. If the ￿rm does produce, it then faces a constant (across productivity levels) probability δ
in every period of a bad shock that would force it to exit. Although there are some realistic examples
of severe shocks that would constrain a ￿rm to exit independently of productivity (such as natural
disasters, new regulation, product liability, major changes in consumer tastes), it is also likely that
e x i tm a yb ec a u s e db yas e r i e so fb a ds h o c k sa ﬀecting the ￿rm￿s productivity. This type of ￿rm
level process is explicitly modeled by Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b). He then shows how these ￿rm
level productivity dynamics give the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels ￿(ϕ)ad i ﬀerent
shape than the ex-ante distribution g(ϕ), and determine the ex-ante survival probabilities for a ￿rm,
conditional on successful entry. The current model foregoes this type of analysis and assumes that
the shape of the equilibrium distribution and the ex-ante survival probabilities are exogenously
determined by g(ϕ)a n dδ. On the other hand, the range of productivity levels, and hence the
average productivity level, are endogenously determined. The increased tractability aﬀorded by
these simpli￿cations permits the detailed analysis of the impact of trade on this endogenous range
of productivity levels and on the distribution of market shares and pro￿ts across this range. Since
the probability δ and especially the shape of g(ϕ) are left unrestricted, it is extremely unlikely that
9This captures the fact that ￿rms can not know their own productivity with certainty until they start producing
and selling their good. (Recall that productivity diﬀerences may re￿e c tc o s td i ﬀe r e n c e sa sw e l la sd i ﬀerences in
consumer valuations of the good.)
8these simpli￿cations will bias the predictions of the model. Importantly, this simpli￿ed industry
model will nevertheless generate the main empirical patterns described in the introduction: Since a
p o r t i o no ft h e￿rms who exit are those who entered with a low productivity draw (and immediately
exit), the overall probability of exit will be negatively correlated with both ￿rm productivity and
age.10 Furthermore, the model also generates the empirical pattern that the average productivity
level of all entrants and exiting ￿rms (including the ￿r m sw h o s ee n t r yi su n s u c c e s s f u l )i sl o w e rt h a n
the average productivity of incumbents. The assumption of the exogenous probability of exit δ
among incumbents does preclude the analysis of the evolution of ￿rm cohorts after the ￿rst period
following entry. On the other hand, the model preserves the essential features that separates the
cohort of new entrants from the incumbents and explains the endogenous selection of heterogeneous
￿rms into the industry.
As previously mentioned, this paper will only consider steady state equilibria, in which the
aggregate variables remain constant over time. Since each ￿rm￿s productivity level does not change
over time, its optimal per period pro￿t level (excluding fe) will also remain constant. An entering
￿rm with productivity ϕ would then immediately exit if this pro￿t level were negative (and hence
never produce), or would produce and earn π(ϕ) ≥ 0 in every period until it is hit with the bad
shock and is forced to exit. Assuming that there is no time discounting,11 each ￿rm￿s value function
















where the dependence of π(ϕ)o nR and P from (5) is understood. Thus, ϕ∗ =i n f {ϕ : v(ϕ) > 0}
identi￿es the lowest productivity level (hereafter referred to as the cutoﬀ level) of producing ￿rms
(recall that π(ϕ) is strictly increasing in ϕ). Since π(0) = −f is negative, π(ϕ∗)m u s tb ee q u a lt o
zero. This will be referred to as the zero cutoﬀ pro￿t condition.
Any entering ￿rm drawing a productivity level ϕ < ϕ∗ will immediately exit and never produce.
Since subsequent ￿rm exit is assumed to be un-correlated with productivity, the exit process will not
aﬀect the equilibrium productivity distribution ￿(ϕ). This distribution must then be determined
by the initial productivity draw, conditional on successful entry. Hence, ￿(ϕ)w i l lb eg i v e nb yt h e
10In this stylized model, ￿rms who enter with low productivity draws exit immediately and do not produce. A
period in this model would then correspond, in the real world, to a time span of a couple years during which a new
￿rm makes the decision to stay or exit. The output produced by these new ￿rms who subsequently exit during this
period is ignored in this model. Passive learning eﬀects, as in Jovanovic (1982), whereby new ￿rms learn about their
unknown productivity levels through noisy cost signals, are probably quite important during this early stage.
11Again, this is assumed for simplicity. The probability of exit δ introduces an eﬀect similar to time discounting.
Modeling an additional time discount factor would not qualitatively change any of the results.






1−G(ϕ∗) if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0o t h e r w i s e ,
(8)
where pin =1− G(ϕ∗) is the ex-ante probability of successful entry.12 This de￿nes the aggregate











The assumption of a ￿nite ￿ ϕ imposes certain restrictions on the size of the upper tail of the
distribution g(ϕ): the (σ − 1)th un-centered moment of g(ϕ)m u s tb e￿nite. (8) clearly shows
how the shape of the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels is tied to the exogenous ex-
ante distribution g(ϕ) while allowing the range of productivity levels (indexed by the cutoﬀ ϕ∗)
to be endogenously determined.14 (9) then shows how this endogenous range aﬀects the aggregate
productivity level.
Zero Cutoﬀ Pro￿tC o n d i t i o n
Since the average productivity level ￿ ϕ is completely determined by the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗,
the average pro￿t and revenue levels are also tied to the cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ (see (6)):












12The equilibrium distribution ￿(ϕ) can be determined from the distribution of initial productivity with certainty
by applying a law of large numbers to g(ϕ): recall that individual ￿rms have zero mass, so a positive mass of entering
￿rms requires an in￿nite number of draws from the distribution g(ϕ). Although some technical problems may arise
when applying a law of large numbers to a continuum of random variables, this will not be the case in the current
situation. See Hopenhayn (1992a, Note 5) and the reference to Feldman and Gilles (1985) for further details.
13This dependence of ￿ ϕ on ϕ
∗ is understood when it is subsequently written without its argument.
14(8) also illustrates the earlier discussion concerning ￿rm cohorts. All cohorts of incumbent ￿rms will have the
same distribution of productivity levels ￿(ϕ). The model thus does not diﬀerentiate between cohorts of incumbent
￿rms. These incumbents essentially form one cohort. This cohort is then critically diﬀerentiated from that formed
by new entrants, whose distribution of productivity levels is given by g(ϕ).
10The zero cutoﬀ pro￿t condition, by pinning down the revenue of the cutoﬀ ￿rm, then implies a
relationship between the average pro￿tp e r￿rm and the cutoﬀ productivity level:
π(ϕ∗)=0 ⇐⇒ r(ϕ∗)=σf












− 1= ﬂ r
r(ϕ∗) − 1i st h ep e r c e n t a g ed i ﬀerence between the average and
cutoﬀ ￿rm revenues, as a function of the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗.
Free Entry and the Value of Firms
Since all incumbent ￿rms ￿ other than the cutoﬀ ￿rm ￿ earn positive pro￿ts, the average pro￿t
level ﬂ π must be positive. In fact, the expectation of future positive pro￿ts is the only reason that
￿rms consider sinking the investment cost fe required for entry. Let ﬂ v represent the present value








ﬂ v is also the average value of ￿rms, conditional on successful entry: ﬂ v =
R ∞
ϕ∗ v(ϕ)￿(ϕ) dϕ.F u r t h e r
de￿ne ve to be the net value of entry:
ve = pinﬂ v − fe =
1 − G(ϕ∗)
δ
ﬂ π − fe. (11)
If this value were negative, no ￿rm would want to enter. In any equilibrium where entry is unre-
stricted, this value could further not be positive since the mass of prospective entrants is unbounded.
5 Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
A stationary equilibrium is de￿ned by constant aggregate variables over time and the free entry
of ￿rms into the industry. Such an equilibrium is completely referenced by a triplet (ϕ∗,P,R)




π(ϕ∗)=0 ( Z e r oC u t o ﬀ Pro￿t)










11Since the aggregate price index (P), revenue (R), and productivity level (￿ ϕ) remain constant,
all other aggregate variables must also remain constant.15 The equilibrium mass of ￿rms M is
determined from the aggregate price index and aggregate productivity level using the aggregation





ρ￿ ϕ. This stationary equilibrium also requires a mass Me of
new entrants in every period, such that the mass of successful entrants, pinMe, exactly replaces
the mass δM of incumbents who are hit with the bad shock and exit: pinMe = δM (This will
be subsequently referred to as the aggregate stability condition.) The equilibrium distribution of
productivity ￿(ϕ) is not aﬀected by this simultaneous entry and exit since the successful entrants
and failing incumbents have the same distribution of productivity levels.
The labor used by these new entrants for investment purposes must, of course, be re￿ected
in the accounting for aggregate labor L,a n da ﬀects the aggregate labor available for production:
L = Lp+Le where Lp and Le represent the aggregate labor used for production and investment (by
new entrants). Aggregate payments to production workers Lp must match the diﬀerence between
aggregate revenue and pro￿t: Lp = R − Π (this is also the labor market clearing condition for
production workers). The market clearing condition for investment workers requires Le = Me fe.







Le can be written:
Le = Mefe =
δM
pin
fe = Mﬂ π = Π.
Thus, aggregate revenue R = Lp + Π = Lp + Le must also equal the total payments to labor L
and is therefore exogenously ￿xed by this index of country size.16 The aggregate price index P can

















This condition, along with (12) and R = L, completely determines the equilibrium triplet (P,R,ϕ∗).
15Recall that aggregate productivity ￿ ϕ will be a function of the cutoﬀ level ϕ
∗ a ss h o w ni n( 9 ) .
16It is important to emphasize that this result is not a direct consequence of aggregation and market clearing
conditions: it is a property of the model￿s stationary equilibrium. Aggregate income need not necessarily equal the
payments to all workers, since there may be some investment income derived from the ￿nancing of new entrants.
Each new entrant raises the capital fe, which provides a random return of π(ϕ)( ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗)o rz e r o( ϕ < ϕ
∗)i ne v e r y
period. In equilibrium, the aggregate return Π equals the aggregate investment cost Le in every period ￿ so there is
no net investment income (this would not be the case with a positive time discount factor).
12Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
The free entry (FE) and zero cutoﬀ pro￿t (ZCP) conditions represent two diﬀerent relationships
between the average pro￿t level ﬂ π and the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗ (see (12)). These two
conditions are discussed in further detail below. I ￿rst summarize their important properties for
the determination of the equilibrium values of ϕ∗ and ﬂ π:I n( ϕ,π) space the FE curve is increasing
and is cut by the ZCP curve only once from above (see appendix for proof). This ensures the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium ϕ∗ and ﬂ π. Furthermore, upward (downward) shifts of
the ZCP curve or downward (upward) shifts of the FE curve must lead to an increase (decrease) in
the equilibrium ϕ∗. The determination of the equilibrium ϕ∗ and ﬂ π is graphically shown in Figure
1.17






r e v e a l st h a ti tr e p r e s e n t sa ni n c r e a s i n gr e l a -
tionship between these two variables. Along the FE curve, ﬂ π increases from δfe to in￿nity for
ϕ∗ ∈ (0,∞): As ϕ∗ increases, the probability of successful entry (pin =1− G(ϕ∗)) decreases
￿ average pro￿ts must therefore increase for ￿rms to remain indiﬀerent about entry. The rela-
tionship between ﬂ π and ϕ∗ implied by the zero cutoﬀ pro￿tc o n d i t i o n( ﬂ π = fk(ϕ∗)) will depend
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r(ϕ∗) − 1 represents the percentage diﬀerence between the average and
cutoﬀ ￿rm revenues. As the cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ goes to zero, the revenue of the cutoﬀ ￿rm also goes to
zero. Since the average revenue level is always positive (even when ϕ∗ → 0), the ratio of the average
to cutoﬀ ￿rm revenue becomes in￿nite as ϕ∗ goes to zero: Along the ZCP curve, ﬂ π →∞as ϕ∗ → 0.
Further properties of k(ϕ) require some extra regularity assumptions on the distribution g(ϕ). If
g(ϕ) belongs to most of the common families of distributions (including the lognormal, exponential,
Gamma, or Weibull distributions or truncations on (0,∞) of the normal, logistic, extreme value, or
Laplace distributions), then k(ϕ) will monotonically decrease to zero on (0,∞).18 In these cases,
ﬂ π decreases from in￿nity to zero for ϕ∗ ∈ (0,∞) along the ZCP curve, as shown in Figure 1.
17Although the ZCP curve must cut the FE curve from above, it is not necessarily downward sloping as represented
in the graph. The following discussion provides some mild additional assumptions on the shape of g(ϕ) that ensure
that the ZCP curve monotonically decreases to zero as shown in the graph.
18Suﬃcient conditions for this property are that
g(ϕ) ϕ
1−G(ϕ) be increasing and unbounded from above on (0,∞). These
regularity conditions ensure that an increase in the cutoﬀ level ϕ
∗ redistributes the mass of incumbent ￿rms towards
the cutoﬀ level. This pushes the average productivity level ￿ ϕ closer to the cutoﬀ ϕ
∗, and hence reduces the percentage
diﬀerence between the revenues of the average and cutoﬀ ￿rms.
13Analysis of the Equilibrium
As was just shown, the equilibrium productivity cutoﬀ level, ϕ∗, and average ￿rm pro￿t, ﬂ π,d o
not depend on the country size L. Hence, the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels ￿(ϕ)
and average productivity level ￿ ϕ will also be independent of country size. Average ￿rm revenue






σ(ﬂ π + f)
. (14)
Hence, a large and small country will share the same ￿rm level variables (same ϕ∗,￿ ϕ,ﬂ r,ﬂ π). The
large country will just have more ￿rms in an amount proportional to its country size. This larger
number of ￿rms will nevertheless be identically distributed over the same productivity range [ϕ∗,∞)
as will be the ￿rms from the small country. Welfare per worker, which is given by
W = P−1 = M
1
σ−1ρ￿ ϕ, (15)
will be higher in the large country due only to increased product variety. This in￿uence of country
size on the determination of aggregate variables is identical to that derived by Krugman (1980)
with representative ￿rms. Once ￿ ϕ and ﬂ π are determined, the aggregate outcome predicted by this
model is identical to one generated by an economy with representative ￿rms who share the same
productivity level ￿ ϕ and pro￿t level ﬂ π. On the other hand, this model with heterogeneous ￿rms
explains how the aggregate productivity level ￿ ϕ and the average ￿rm pro￿t level ﬂ π are endogenously
determined and how both can change in response to various shocks. In particular, a country￿s
production technology (referenced by the distribution g(ϕ)) need not change in order to induce
changes in aggregate productivity. In the following sections, I argue that the exposure of a country
to trade creates precisely the type of shock that induces reallocations between ￿rms and generates
increases in aggregate productivity. These results can not be explained by representative ￿rm
models where the aggregate productivity level is exogenously given as the productivity level common
to all ￿rms. Changes in aggregate productivity can then only result from changes in ￿rm level
technology and not from reallocations.
14Comparative Statics
Before using this model to analyze the industry and ￿rm level responses to changes in trade regime,
two of the comparative statics of the closed economy model are brie￿y described. An increase
in the sunk entry cost fe will shift up the FE curve and lower the equilibrium cutoﬀ level ϕ∗.
Aggregate productivity must then decrease with the cutoﬀ level (￿ ϕ is an increasing function of
ϕ∗). Although the direction of the change in product variety is ambiguous (product variety will
decrease so long as the ZCP curve is downward sloping), the decrease in aggregate productivity
is enough to unambiguously entail a welfare loss (see appendix for proof). If an upper bound on
￿rm productivity were incorporated into this model, then the possibility of representative ￿rms is
obtained as a limiting case when the entry cost goes to zero. In this case, the cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ and
average level ￿ ϕ are both pushed towards the productivity upper bound and the average pro￿t level
is driven to zero, as shown in Figure 2.
An increase in the ￿x e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s tf will shift up the ZCP curve and therefore raise the
equilibrium cutoﬀ level ϕ∗, along with aggregate productivity: ￿rms previously producing with low
productivity levels can no longer earn positive pro￿ts and exit. The average pro￿t level ﬂ π must
increase, as the FE curve is upward sloping . The higher pro￿t level will, in turn, imply a decrease
in product variety (see (14)). The product variety decrease and the aggregate productivity increase
have opposite eﬀects on welfare. In the appendix, it is shown that the sign of the welfare change
is negative and hence that the lower product variety eﬀect dominates that of the higher aggregate
productivity. This yields the reasonable property that higher production costs have an overall
negative impact on welfare.
6 Overview and Assumptions of the Open Economy Model
I now examine the impact of trade in a world (or trade bloc) that is composed of countries whose
economies are of the type that was previously described. When there are no additional costs
associated with trade, then trade allows the individual countries to replicate the outcome of the
integrated world economy.19 Trade then provides the same opportunities to an open economy as
would an increase in country size to a closed economy. As was previously discussed, an increase
in country size has no eﬀect on ￿rm level outcomes. The transition to trade will thus not aﬀect
19Consumers in every country have access to the same bundle of goods at the same aggregate price index. Firms
behave as if they were selling their product in the integrated world market. The FE and ZCP conditions will be
identical across countries and will not be aﬀected by the transition to trade.
15any of the ￿rm level variables (ϕ∗, ￿ ϕ, ﬂ r, ﬂ π): The same number of ￿rms in each country produce at
the same output levels and earn the same pro￿ts as they did in the closed economy. All ￿rms in a
given country divide their sales between domestic and foreign consumers, based on the size of their
country relative to the integrated world economy. Thus, in the absence of any costs to trade, the
existence of ￿rm heterogeneity does not aﬀect the impact of trade. This impact is identical to the
one described by Krugman (1980) with representative ￿rms: Although ￿rms are not aﬀected by
the transition to trade, consumers enjoy welfare gains driven by the increase in product variety.20
On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that ￿rms wishing to export not only face per-
unit costs (such as transport costs and tariﬀs ) ,b u ta l s o￿c r i t i c a l l y￿f a c es o m e￿xed costs that do
not vary with export volume. In a world with ￿rm level heterogeneity, the existence of such costs
provides the most consistent explanation for the widely observed pattern that, across countries
and industries, certain ￿rms do not export while others in the same narrowly de￿ned industry
do. Interviews with managers making export decisions con￿rm that ￿rms in diﬀerentiated product
industries face signi￿cant ￿xed costs associated with the entry into export markets (see Roberts and
Tybout (1997b)): A ￿rm must ￿nd and inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about the
foreign market. It must then research the foreign regulatory environment and adapt its product
to ensure that it conforms to foreign standards (which include testing, packaging, and labeling
requirements). An exporting ￿rm must also set up new distribution channels in the foreign country
and conform to all the shipping rules speci￿ed by the foreign customs agency. Although some of
these costs can not be avoided, others are often manipulated by governments in order to erect
non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) to trade. Regardless of their origin, these costs are most appropriately
modeled as independent of the ￿rm￿s export volume decision.21
When there is uncertainty concerning the export market, the timing and sunk nature of the
20The irrelevance of ￿rm heterogeneity for the impact of trade is not just a consequence of negligible trade costs.
The assumption of an exogenously ￿xed elasticity of substitution between varieties also plays a signi￿cant role in this
result. The presence of heterogeneity (even in the absence of trade costs) plays a signi￿cant role in determining the
impact of trade once this assumption is dropped. In a separate appendix (available upon request to the author), the
current model is modi￿ed by allowing the elasticity of substitution to endogenously increase with product variety.
This link between trade and the elasticity of substitution was studied by Krugman (1979) with representative ￿rms.
In the context of the current model, the appendix shows how the size of the economy then aﬀects the aggregate
productivity level and the skewness of market shares and pro￿ts across ￿rms with diﬀerent productivity levels. Larger
economies have higher aggregate productivity levels ￿ even though they have the same ￿rm level technology index
by g(ϕ). Therefore, even in the absence of trade costs, trade increases the size of the ￿world￿ economy and induces
reallocations of market shares and pro￿ts towards more productive ￿rms and generates an aggregate productivity
gain.
21The modeling of a ￿xed export cost is not new. Bernard and Jensen (1999a), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998),
Roberts and Tybout (1997a), and Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout (1995) all introduce a ￿xed export cost into the
theoretical sections of their work in order to explain the self-selection of ￿rms into the export market. However, these
analyses are restricted to a partial equilibrium setting in which the distribution of ￿rm productivity levels is ￿xed.
16costs become quite relevant for the export decision (most of the previously mentioned costs must
be sunk prior to entry into the export market).22 The strong and robust empirical correlations at
the ￿rm level between export status and productivity suggest that the export market entry decision
occurs after the ￿rm gains knowledge of its productivity, and hence that uncertainty concerning
the export markets is not predominantly about productivity (as is the uncertainty prior to entry
into the industry). I therefore assume that a ￿r mw h ow i s h e st oe x p o r tm u s tm a k ea ni n i t i a l￿xed
investment, but that this investment decision occurs after the ￿rm￿s productivity is revealed. For
simplicity, I do not model any additional uncertainty concerning the export markets. The per-unit
trade costs are modeled in the standard iceberg formulation, whereby τ > 1u n i t so fag o o dm u s t
be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at destination.
Although the size of a country relative to the rest of the world (which constitutes its trading
partners) is left unrestricted, I do assume that the world (or trading group) is comprised of some
number of identical countries. In other words, a representative country framework is assumed.
This assumption is made in order to ensure factor price equalization across countries and hence
focus the analysis on ￿rm selection eﬀects that are independent of wage diﬀerences. In this model
with ￿xed export costs, countries who diﬀer only in country size can exhibit diﬀerent wage rates in
the equilibrium with trade. These wage diﬀerences then induce further ￿rm selection eﬀects and
aggregate productivity diﬀerences across countries.23 I thus assume that the economy under study
can trade with n ≥ 1 other countries (the world is then comprised of n +1≥ 2c o u n t r i e s ) .F i r m s
can export their products to any country, although entry into each of these export markets requires
a ￿x e di n v e s t m e n tc o s to ffex > 0 (measured in units of labor). Regardless of export status, a ￿rm
still incurs the same overhead production cost f.
7 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
The symmetry assumption ensures that all countries share the same wage, which is still normalized
to one, and also share the same aggregate variables. Each ￿rm￿s pricing rule in its domestic market is
given, as before, by pd(ϕ)= w
ρϕ = 1
ρϕ. Firms who export will set higher prices in the foreign markets
that re￿ect the increased marginal cost τ of serving these markets: px(ϕ)= τ
ρϕ = τpd(ϕ). Thus,
the revenues earned from domestic sales and export sales to any given country are, respectively:
22Roberts and Tybout (1997a) ￿nd that the sunk nature of these costs and the foreign market uncertainty play a
signi￿cant role in explaining hysteresis eﬀects associated with ￿rm level export decisions in Colombia.
23In these asymmetric equilibria with ￿xed export costs, large countries enjoys higher aggregate productivity,
welfare, and wages relative to smaller countries. The analysis of these equilibria is left for future work.
17rd(ϕ)=R(Pρϕ)σ−1 and rx(ϕ)=τ1−σrd(ϕ)
where R and P denote the aggregate expenditure and price index in every country. The balance of
payments condition implies that R also represents the aggregate revenue of ￿rms in any country,






rd(ϕ)i f t h e ￿rm does not export,
rd(ϕ)+nrx(ϕ)=( 1+nτ1−σ)rd(ϕ)i f t h e ￿rm exports to all countries.
(16)
If some ￿rms do not export, then there no longer exists an integrated world market for all goods.
Even though the symmetry assumption ensures that all the characteristics of the goods available
in every country are similar, the actual bundle of goods available will be diﬀerent across countries:
consumers in each country have access to goods (produced by the non-exporting ￿rms) that are
not available to consumers in any other country.
Firm Entry, Exit, and Export Status
All the exogenous factors aﬀecting ￿rm entry, exit, and productivity levels remain unchanged by
trade. Prior to entry, ￿rms face the same ex-ante distribution of productivity levels g(ϕ). Firms
whose entry is successful produce with the same productivity level ϕ in every period. They all
face the same probability δ of a bad shock that would force them to exit. Upon entry with a
low productivity draw, a ￿rm may decide to immediately exit and not produce. In a stationary
equilibrium, any incumbent ￿rm with productivity ϕ earns variable pro￿ts
rx(ϕ)
σ in every period
from its export sales to any given country. Since the export cost is assumed equal across countries,
a ￿rm will either export to all countries in every period or never export.24 Given that the export
decision occurs after ￿rms know their productivity ϕ, and since there is no additional export
market uncertainty, ￿rms are indiﬀerent between paying the one time investment cost fex,o r
paying the amortized per-period portion of this cost fx = δfex in every period (as before, there
is no additional time discounting other than the probability of the exit inducing shock δ). This
per-period representation of the export cost is henceforth adopted for notational simplicity. In the
24The restriction that export costs are equal across countries can be relaxed. Some ￿rms then export to some
countries but not others ￿ depending on these cost diﬀerences. This extension would also generate an increasing
relationship between a ￿rm￿s productivity and the number of countries it exports to.
18stationary equilibrium, the aggregate labor resources used in every period to cover the export costs
do not depend on this choice of representation.25 The per-period pro￿t ￿ow of any exporting ￿rm
then re￿ects the per-period ￿xed cost fx, which is incurred per export country.
Since no ￿rm will ever export and not also produce for its domestic market,26 each ￿rm￿s pro￿t
can be separated into portions earned from domestic sales (πd(ϕ)) and export sales per country








A ￿rm who produces for its domestic market exports to all n countries if πx(ϕ) ≥ 0. Each ￿rm￿s
combined pro￿t can then be written:
π(ϕ)=πd(ϕ)+m a x{0,nπx(ϕ)}.
As before, a ￿rm￿s value is the present value (discounted by the probability of the bad shock) of its





,a n dϕ∗ =i n f{ϕ : v(ϕ) > 0} still identi￿es the cutoﬀ produc-
tivity level for successful entry into the industry. Additionally, ϕ∗
x =i n f{ϕ : ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ and πx(ϕ) > 0}
now represents the cutoﬀ productivity level for exporting ￿rms. If ϕ∗
x = ϕ∗,t h e na l l￿rms in the
industry export. In this case, the cutoﬀ ￿rm (with productivity level ϕ∗ = ϕ∗
x) earns zero total
pro￿t( π(ϕ∗)=πd(ϕ∗)+nπx(ϕ∗) = 0) and non-negative export pro￿t( πx(ϕ∗) ≥ 0). If ϕ∗
x > ϕ∗,
then some ￿rms (with productivity levels between ϕ∗ and ϕ∗
x) produce exclusively for their domestic
market. These ￿rms do not export as their export pro￿t sw o u l db en e g a t i v e( πx(ϕ) < 0). They
earn non-negative pro￿ts exclusively from their domestic sales (π(ϕ)=πd(ϕ) ≥ 0). The ￿rms with
productivity levels above the second cutoﬀ ϕ∗
x earn positive pro￿ts from both their domestic and
export sales. By their de￿nition, the cutoﬀ levels must then satisfy πd(ϕ∗)=0a n dπx(ϕ∗
x)=0 .
This partitioning of ￿r m sb ye x p o r ts t a t u sw i l lo c c u ri fa n do n l yi fτσ−1fx >f : the trade costs
relative to the overhead production cost must be above a threshold level. Note that, when there are
no ￿xed (sunk) export costs (fx = 0), no level of variable cost τ > 1 can induce this partitioning.
However, a large enough ￿xed export cost fx >fwill induce partitioning even when there are no
25In one case, only the new entrants who export expend resources to cover the full investment cost fex.I n t h e
other case, all exporting ￿rms expend resources to cover the smaller amortized portion of the cost fx = δfex.I n
equilibrium, the ratio of new exporters to all exporters is δ (see appendix), so the same aggregate labor resources are
expended in either case.
26A ￿r mw o u l de a r ns t r i c t l yh i g h e rp r o ￿ts by also producing for its domestic market since the associated variable
pro￿t
rd(ϕ)
σ is always positive and the overhead production cost f is already incurred.
19variable trade costs. As the partitioning of ￿rms by export status (within sectors) is empirically
ubiquitous, I will henceforth assume that the combination of ￿xed and variable trade costs are high
enough to generate partitioning, and therefore that τσ−1fx >f . Although the equilibrium where
all ￿rms export will not be formally derived, it exhibits several similar properties to the equilibrium
with partitioning that will be highlighted.27
Once again, the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels for incumbent ￿rms, ￿(ϕ), is
determined by the ex-ante distribution of productivity levels, conditional on successful entry:
￿(ϕ)=
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗), ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. pin =1− G(ϕ∗) still identi￿es the ex-ante probability of successful
entry. Furthermore, px =
1−G(ϕ∗
x)
1−G(ϕ∗) now represents the ex-ante probability that one of these success-
ful ￿rms will export. px must then also represent the ex-post fraction of ￿rms that export. Let M
denote the equilibrium mass of incumbent ￿rms in any country. Mx = px M then represents the
mass of exporting ￿rms while Mt = M + nM x represents the total mass of varieties available to
consumers in any country (or alternatively, the total mass of ￿rms competing in any country).
Aggregation
Using the same weighted average function de￿n e di n( 9 ) ,l e t￿ ϕ =￿ ϕ(ϕ∗)a n d￿ ϕx =￿ ϕ(ϕ∗
x)d e n o t e
the average productivity levels of, respectively, all ￿rms and exporting ￿rms only. The average
productivity across all ￿rms, ￿ ϕ, is based only on domestic market share diﬀerences between ￿rms
(as re￿ected by diﬀerences in the ￿rms￿ productivity levels). If some ￿rms do not export, then this
average will not re￿ect the additional export shares of the more productive ￿rms. Furthermore,
neither ￿ ϕ nor ￿ ϕx re￿ect the proportion τ of output units that are ￿lost￿ in export transit. Let
￿ ϕt be the weighted productivity average that re￿ects the combined market share of all ￿rms and
the output shrinkage linked to exporting. Again, using the weighted average function (9), this











By symmetry, ￿ ϕt is also the weighted average productivity of all ￿rms (domestic and foreign)
competing in a single country (where the productivity of exporters is adjusted by the trade cost
27Even when there is no partitioning of ￿rms by export status, the opening of the economy to trade will still induce
reallocations and distributional changes among the heterogeneous ￿rms ￿ so long as the ￿xed export costs are positive
(fx = 0). In the absence of such costs (given any level of per-unit costs τ), opening to trade will not induce any
distributional changes among ￿rms, and heterogeneity will not play an important role.
20τ). As was the case in the closed economy, this productivity average plays an important role as
it once again completely summarizes the eﬀects of the distribution of productivity levels ￿(ϕ)o n
the aggregate outcome. Thus, the aggregate price index P, expenditure level R,a n dw e l f a r ep e r
worker W in any country can then be written as functions only of the productivity average ￿ ϕt and
















t ρ￿ ϕt (18)
By construction, the productivity averages ￿ ϕ and ￿ ϕx can also be used to express the average
pro￿t and revenue levels across diﬀerent groups of ￿rms: rd(￿ ϕ)a n dπd(￿ ϕ)r e p r e s e n tt h ea v e r a g e
revenue and pro￿t earned by domestic ￿rms from sales in their own country. Similarly, rx(￿ ϕx)a n d
πx(￿ ϕx) represent the average export revenue and pro￿t (to any given country) across all domestic
￿rms who export. The overall average, across all domestic ￿rms, of combined revenue (ﬂ r)a n dp r o ￿t
(ﬂ π), earned from both domestic and export sales, is thus given by:
ﬂ r = rd(￿ ϕ)+pxnrx(￿ ϕx)a n dﬂ π = πd(￿ ϕ)+pxnπx(￿ ϕx)( 1 9 )
Equilibrium Conditions
As in the closed economy equilibrium, the zero cutoﬀ pro￿t condition will imply a relationship





















as was previously de￿ned. The zero cutoﬀ pro￿t condition also
implies that ϕ∗





















Using (19), ﬂ π can therefore be expressed as a function of the cutoﬀ level ϕ∗:
28In other words, the aggregate equilibrium in any country is identical to one with Mt representative ￿rms that all
share the same productivity level ￿ ϕt.
29Recall that rx(ϕ)=τ
1−σrd(ϕ) ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗.
21ﬂ π = πd(￿ ϕ)+pxnπx(￿ ϕx)
= fk(ϕ∗)+pxnfx k(ϕ∗
x)( Z C P ) ( 2 1 )
where ϕ∗
x, and hence px are implicitly de￿ned as functions of ϕ∗ using (20).
As before, ﬂ v =
P∞
t=0(1−δ)tﬂ π = 1
δ ﬂ π r e p r e s e n t st h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h ea v e r a g ep r o ￿t ￿ows and
ve = pin ﬂ v − fe yields the net value of entry. The free entry condition thus remains unchanged:
ve =0 ⇐⇒ ﬂ π =
δ fe
pin (FE). Regardless of pro￿td i ﬀerences across ￿r m s( b a s e do ne x p o r ts t a t u s ) ,
the expected value of future pro￿ts, in equilibrium, must equal the ￿xed investment cost.
Determination of the Equilibrium
As in the closed economy case, a stationary equilibrium is uniquely determined by the triplet
(ϕ∗,P,R) satisfying the free entry and zero cutoﬀ pro￿t conditions. It is shown in the appendix that
t h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o na n dt h en e wz e r oc u t o ﬀ pro￿t condition and (20)) identify a unique ϕ∗ and
ﬂ π (the new ZCP curve still cuts the FE curve from above). The equilibrium ϕ∗, in turn, determines
the export productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗
x as well as the average productivity levels ￿ ϕ,￿ ϕx,￿ ϕt,a n dt h e
ex-ante successful entry and export probabilities pin and px. As was the case in the closed economy
equilibrium, the free entry condition and the aggregate stability condition30 (pin Me = δM) ensure
that the aggregate payment to the investment workers Le equals the aggregate pro￿t level Π.T h u s ,
once again, aggregate revenue R is exogenously given by the size of the labor force: R = L.A s
shown in (18), the aggregate price index is determined by the aggregate number of goods available
in each country (Mt) and the average productivity level across all ￿rms selling these goods (￿ ϕt). It
therefore remains to be shown that the number of ￿rms M in either country (and hence, the number
of varieties available Mt =( 1+px)M) is uniquely determined by the equilibrium conditions.
Following a line of argument similar to the one used in the closed economy case, the number
of ￿rms is obtained from the equilibrium conditions by using the property that these conditions
30Recall that this condition ensures that the mass of successful entrants matches the mass of incumbent ￿rms who
exit.
22identify the average revenue per ￿rm (ﬂ r)i n d e p e n d e n t l yo fM (see (19)):
ﬂ r = rd(￿ ϕ)+pxnrx(￿ ϕx)
= σ (ﬂ π + f)+pxnσ[πx(￿ ϕx)+fx]
= σ(ﬂ π + f + pxnfx),






σ(ﬂ π + f + pxnfx)
. (22)
Almost all of these equilibrium conditions also apply to the case where all ￿rms export. The only
diﬀerence is that ϕ∗
x = ϕ∗ (and hence px = 1) and (20) no longer holds.
8 The Impact of Trade
The result that the modeling of ￿xed export costs explains the partitioning of ￿rms by export status
and productivity level is not exactly earth-shattering. This can be explained quite easily within
a simple partial equilibrium model with a ￿xed distribution of ￿rm productivity levels. On the
other hand, such a model would be ill-suited to address several important questions concerning the
impact of trade in the presence of export market entry costs and ￿rm heterogeneity: What happens
to the range of ￿rm productivity levels? Do all ￿rms bene￿t from trade or does the impact depend
on a ￿rm￿s productivity? How is aggregate productivity and welfare aﬀected? The current model is
much better suited to address these questions,31 which are answered in the following sections. The
current section examines the eﬀects of a transition from autarky (the closed economy previously
described) to the open economy. The following section then studies the impact of incremental trade
liberalization, once the economy is open.
Let ϕ∗
a and ￿ ϕa denote the cutoﬀ and average productivity levels in autarky. I use the notation of
the previous section for all variables and functions pertaining to the new open economy equilibrium.
As was previously mentioned, the FE condition is identical in both the closed and open economy.
Inspection of the new ZCP condition in the open economy (21) relative to the one in the closed
economy (12) immediately reveals that the ZCP curve shifts up: the exposure to trade induces an
31In order to plausibly address these questions, a model should allow for the endogenous selection of the heteroge-
neous ￿rms into the industry and incorporate the general equilibrium feedback link between wages and productivity.
23increase in the cutoﬀ productivity level (ϕ∗ > ϕ∗
a) and in the average pro￿tp e r￿rm.32 The least
productive ￿rms with productivity levels between ϕ∗
a and ϕ∗ can no longer earn positive pro￿ts in
the new trade equilibrium and therefore exit. Another selection process also occurs since only the
￿rms with productivity levels above ϕ∗
x enter the export markets. This export market selection
eﬀect and the domestic market selection eﬀect (of ￿rms out of the industry) both reallocate market
shares towards more eﬃcient ￿rms and contribute to an aggregate productivity gain.33
Inspection of the equations for the equilibrium number of ￿rms ((14) and (22)) reveals that
M<M a where Ma represents the number of ￿rms in autarky.34 Although the number of ￿rms in a
country decreases after the transition to trade, consumers in the country still typically enjoy greater
product variety (Mt =( 1+px)M>M a). That is, the decrease in the number of domestic ￿rms
following the transition to trade is typically dominated by the number of new foreign exporters. It
is nevertheless possible, when the export costs are high, that these foreign ￿rms replace a larger
number of domestic ￿rms (if the latter are suﬃciently less productive). Although product variety
then impacts negatively on welfare, this eﬀect is necessarily dominated by the positive contribution
of the aggregate productivity gain. Trade ￿ even though it is costly ￿ necessarily generates a welfare
gain (see appendix for proof).
The Reallocation of Market Shares and Pro￿ts Across Firms
I now examine how the impact of trade on individual ￿rms changes with the ￿rm￿s productivity
level. To do this, I track the performance of a ￿rm with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
a during the transition
from autarky to trade. Let ra(ϕ) > 0a n dπa(ϕ) ≥ 0d e n o t et h e￿rm￿s revenue and pro￿ti n
autarky. Recall that, in both the closed and open economy equilibria, the aggregate revenue of





the ￿rm￿s market share (within the domestic industry) in autarky and in the equilibrium with trade.
Additionally, in this equilibrium with trade,
rd(ϕ)
R represents the ￿rm￿s share of its domestic market
(since rd(ϕ)i st h e￿rm￿s domestic revenue and R also represents aggregate consumer expenditure in
t h ec o u n t r y ) .T h ei m p a c to ft r a d eo nt h i s￿rm￿s market share can be evaluated using the following
32Recall that the FE curve must be upward sloping and cuts the ZCP curve from below.
33Because ￿ ϕt factors in the output lost in export transit (from τ), it is possible for ￿ ϕt to be lower than ￿ ϕa when τ
is high and fx is low. It is shown in the appendix that any productivity average that is based on a ￿rm￿s output ￿at
the factory gate ￿ must be higher in the open economy than in autarky.
34Recall that the average pro￿tﬂ π must be higher in the open economy equilibrium.
24inequalities (see appendix):
rd(ϕ) <r a(ϕ) <r d(ϕ)+nrx(ϕ), ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗.
The ￿rst part of the inequality indicates that all ￿rms incur a loss in their share of their domestic
market with the transition to trade. A ￿rm who does not export then also incurs a total revenue
loss. The second part of the inequality indicates that a ￿rm who exports more than makes up for its
loss of domestic sales with export sales and increases its total revenues. Thus, a ￿rm who exports
increases its share of industry revenues while a ￿rm who does not export loses market share. ϕ∗
x
is then also the cutoﬀ level that partitions the ￿rms between those who gain and those who lose
market share. (The market share of the least productive ￿rms in the autarky equilibrium ￿ with
productivity between ϕ∗
a and ϕ∗ ￿ drops down to zero as these ￿rms exit.)
Now consider the change in pro￿te a r n e db ya￿rm with productivity level ϕ during the transition
to trade. If the ￿rm does not export in the new trade equilibrium, then it must incur a pro￿t loss,
since its revenue, and hence variable pro￿t, is now lower. The direction of the pro￿t change for an
exporting ￿rm is not immediately clear since it involves a trade-oﬀ between the increase in total
revenue (and hence variable pro￿t) and the increase in ￿xed cost due to the additional export cost.
For such a ￿rm (ϕ ≥ ϕ∗





















mustbe positive sincerd(ϕ)+nr x(ϕ) >r a(ϕ)f o rs o m eϕ > 0. The pro￿t
change for an exporting ￿rm, ∆π(ϕ), will thus be an increasing function of the ￿rm￿s productivity
level ϕ. In addition, this change must be negative for the exporting ￿rm with the cutoﬀ productivity
level ϕ∗
x:36 Therefore, there must exist another cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ￿ > ϕ∗
x that partitions
the ￿rms between those who gain and those who lose pro￿ts. Within this group of eﬃcient ￿rms
who both export and increase their pro￿ts (ϕ > ϕ￿), the pro￿t gain increases with the ￿rm￿s





















25Summarizing these results on the ￿rm level impact of trade by stating that the bene￿ts of trade
are not equally spread across ￿rms would be quite an understatement! It was just shown how the
exposure to trade generates the type of Darwinian evolution described in the introduction: the
most eﬃcient ￿rms thrive and grow ￿ they export and increase both their market share and pro￿ts.
Some less eﬃcient ￿rms still export and increase their market share but incur a pro￿t loss. Some
even less eﬃcient ￿r m sr e m a i ni nt h ei n d u s t r yb u td on o te x p o r ta n di n c u rl o s s e so fb o t hm a r k e t
share and pro￿t. Finally, the least eﬃcient ￿rms are driven out of the industry.
Why Does Trade Force the Least Productive Firms to Exit?
The most obvious cause explaining the exit of the least productive domestic ￿rms would be the
new competition from the entry of the more productive ￿rms into the domestic market. However,
this intuition is incorrect. In order to highlight this point, it is necessary to consider breaking the
model￿s symmetry between opening the economy to import competition and to new export markets.
If the current model were amended to allow for the new import competition without introducing any
export opportunities, then this trade opening would not induce any distributional changes among
￿rms. With C.E.S. product diﬀerentiation, the new import competition aﬀects domestic ￿rms with
diﬀerent productivity levels in similar ways, and translates only into a reduction in aggregate sales
for all domestic ￿rms. In equilibrium, this induces a reduction in the number of surviving domestic
￿rms while holding the distribution of ￿rm productivity levels and relative market shares constant.
On the other hand, if the model were amended to allow for the opening of new export markets
without any import competition, then distributional changes very similar to those described for
the symmetric trade case would occur (and the least productive ￿rms would be forced to exit the
industry). When entry into new export markets is costly, then this exposure to trade aﬀects ￿rms
with diﬀerent productivity levels in diﬀerent ways: the new export markets oﬀer increased pro￿t
opportunities only t ot h em o r ep r o d u c t i v e￿rms who can ￿aﬀord￿ to pay the export market entry
costs. In equilibrium, an increase in the pro￿ts of more productive ￿r m sr e l a t i v et ol e s sp r o d u c t i v e
￿rms leads to more entry and a higher cutoﬀ productivity level. It is therefore the ￿pull￿ of the
export markets, rather than the ￿push￿ of import competition that forces the least productive ￿rms
to exit.
269 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
The preceding analysis compared the equilibrium outcomes of an economy undergoing a massive
change in trade regime from autarky to trade. Very few, if any, of the world￿s current economies
can be considered to operate in an autarky environment. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether
an increase in the exposure of an economy to trade will induce the same eﬀects as were previously
described for the transition of an economy from autarky. The current model is well-suited to
address several diﬀerent mechanisms that would produce an increase in trade exposure and plausibly
correspond to observed decreases in trade costs over time or some speci￿c policies to liberalize trade.
The eﬀects of three such mechanisms are investigated: an increase in the number of available trading
partners (resulting, for example, from the incorporation of additional countries into a trade bloc)
and a decrease in either the ￿xed or variable trade costs (resulting either from decreases in real
costs levels or from multi-lateral agreements to reduce tariﬀs or non-tariﬀ barriers to trade). These
three scenarios involve comparative statics of the open economy equilibrium with respect to n,
τ,a n dfx. The main impact of the transition from autarky to trade was an increase in aggregate
productivity and welfare generated by a reallocation of market shares towards more productive ￿rms
(where the least productive ￿rms are forced to exit). I will show that increases in the exposure to
trade occurring through any of these mechanisms will generate very similar results: in all cases, the
exposure to trade will force the least productive ￿rms to exit and will reallocate market shares from
less productive to more productive ￿rms. The increased exposure to trade will also unequivocally
deliver welfare gains.37
Increase in the Number of Trading Partners
I ￿rst investigate the eﬀects of an increase in n. Throughout this comparative static exercise, I use
the notation of the open economy equilibrium to describe the old equilibrium with n countries. I
then add primes (0) to all variables and functions when they pertain to the new equilibrium with
n0 >ncountries.
Inspection of equations (21) and (20) de￿ning the new zero cutoﬀ pro￿t condition (as a function
o ft h ed o m e s t i cc u t o ﬀ ϕ∗) reveals that the ZCP curve will shift up and therefore that both cutoﬀ
productivity levels increase with n: ϕ∗0 > ϕ∗ and ϕ∗0
x > ϕ∗
x. The increase in the number of trading
partners thus forces the least productive ￿rms to exit. As was the case with the transition from
37Formal derivations of all the comparative statics are relegated to the appendix.
27autarky, the increased exposure to trade forces all ￿rms to relinquish a portion of their share of their
domestic market: rd
0(ϕ) <r d(ϕ), ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. The less productive ￿rms who do not export (with
ϕ < ϕ∗0
x ) thus incur a revenue and pro￿t loss ￿ and the least productive among them therefore exit.38
Again, as was the case with the transition from autarky, the ￿rms who export (with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗0
x )m o r e
than make up for their loss of domestic sales with their sales to the new export markets and increase
their combined revenues: rd
0(ϕ)+n0rx
0(ϕ) >r d(ϕ)+nrx(ϕ). Some of these ￿rms nevertheless incur
ad e c r e a s ei np r o ￿ts due to the new ￿xed export costs, but the most productive ￿rms among this
group also enjoy an increase in pro￿ts (which is increasing with the ￿rms￿ productivity level). Thus,
both market shares and pro￿ts are reallocated towards the more eﬃcient ￿rms. As was the case for
the transition from autarky, this reallocation of market shares generates an aggregate productivity
g a i na n da ni n c r e a s ei nw e l f a r e . 39
Decrease in Trade Costs
A decrease in the variable trade cost τ will induce almost identical eﬀects to those just described for
the increase in trading partners. The decrease from τ to τ0 < τ (again I use primes to reference all
variables and functions in the new equilibrium) will shift up the ZCP curve and induce an increase
in the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗0 > ϕ∗.T h e o n l y d i ﬀerence will be that the new export cutoﬀ
productivity level ϕ∗0
x will now be below ϕ∗
x. As before, the increased exposure to trade will force
the least productive ￿rms to exit, but it will now also generate the entry of new ￿rms into the
export market (who did not export with the higher τ). The direction of the reallocation of market
shares and pro￿ts will be identical to those previously described: all ￿rms will lose a portion of
their domestic sales, so that the ￿rms who do not export incur both a market share and pro￿t loss.
T h em o r ep r o d u c t i v e￿rms who export more than make up for their loss of domestic sales with
their increased export sales, and the most productive ￿rms among this group also increase their
pro￿ts. As before, the exit of the least productive ￿rms and the market share increase of the most
productive ￿rms both contribute to an aggregate productivity gain and an increase in welfare.40





x . The loss of export sales to any given country (from rx(ϕ)d o w nt orx
0(ϕ)) is such that ￿rms entering




x w i l ln o te x p o r ta st h el o w e rv a r i a b l ep r o ￿t
rx
0(ϕ)
σ no longer covers the
amortized portion of the entry cost fx. On the other hand, incumbent ￿rms with productivity levels in this range
have already incurred the sunk export entry cost and have no reason to exit the export markets until they are hit
with the bad shock and exit the industry. Eventually, all these incumbent ￿rms exit and no ￿rm with a productivity
level in that range will export once the new steady state equilibrium is attained.
39As pointed out in note 33, the productivity average must be based on a ￿rm￿s output ￿at the factory gate￿.
40See note (39)
28Ad e c r e a s ei nt h e￿xed export market entry cost fx will induce similar changes in the cutoﬀ
levels as the decrease in τ. The increased exposure to trade forces the least productive ￿rms to
exit (ϕ∗ rises) and generates entry of new ￿rms into the export market (ϕ∗
x decreases). These
selection eﬀects both contribute to an aggregate productivity increase if the new exporters are
more productive than the average productivity level. Although the less productive ￿rms who do
not export incur both a market share and pro￿tl o s s ,t h em a r k e ts h a r ea n dp r o ￿t reallocations
towards the more productive ￿rms, in this case, will not be similar to those for the previous two
cases: the decrease in fx will not increase the combined market share or pro￿to fa n y￿rm that
already exported prior to the change in fx ￿ only new exporters increase their combined sales.
However, as in the previous two cases, welfare will necessarily be higher in the new steady state
equilibrium. Both types of trade costs decreases described above also help to explain another
empirical feature reported by Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout (1995) that some export booms are
driven by the entry of new ￿rms into the export markets.41
10 Conclusion
This paper has described and analyzed a new transmission channel for the impact of trade on
industry structure and performance. Since this channel works through intra-industry reallocations
across ￿rms, it can only be studied within an industry model that incorporates ￿rm level hetero-
geneity. Recent empirical work has highlighted the importance of this channel for understanding
and explaining the eﬀects of trade on ￿rm and industry performance.
The paper shows how the existence of export market entry costs drastically aﬀects how the im-
pact of trade is distributed across diﬀerent types of ￿rms. The induced reallocations between these
diﬀerent ￿rms generate changes in a country￿s aggregate environment that can not be explained by
a model based on representative ￿rms. On one hand, the paper shows that the existence of such
costs to trade does not aﬀect the welfare-enhancing properties of trade: one of the most robust
results of this paper is that increases in a country￿s exposure to trade lead to welfare gains. On
the other hand, the paper shows how the export costs signi￿cantly alter the distribution of the
gains from trade across ￿rms. In fact, only a portion of the ￿r m s￿t h em o r ee ﬃcient ones ￿ reap
bene￿ts from trade in the form of gains in market share and pro￿t. Less eﬃcient ￿rms lose both.
The exposure to trade, or increases in this exposure, force the least eﬃcient ￿rms out of the indus-
41Over half of the substantial export growth in Colombian and Mexican manufacturing sectors was generated by
the entry of ￿rms into the export markets.
29try. These trade-induced reallocations towards more eﬃcient ￿rms explain why trade may generate
aggregate productivity gains without necessarily improving the productive eﬃciency of individual
￿rms. Although increases in the exposure to trade always generates more import competition, the
latter is not the root cause behind the exit of the least productive ￿rms. This exit is always driven
by the entry of ￿rms in response to the higher relative pro￿ts earned by exporters.
Although this model mainly highlights the long-run bene￿ts associated with the trade-induced
reallocations within an industry, the reallocation of these resources also obviously entails some
short-run costs. It is therefore important to have a model that can predict the impact of trade
policy on inter-￿rm reallocations in order to design accompanying policies that would address issues
related to the transition towards a new regime. These policies could help palliate the transitional
costs while taking care not to hinder the reallocation process. Of course, the model also clearly
indicates that policies that hinder the reallocation process or otherwise interfere with the ￿exibility
of the factor markets may delay or even prevent a country from reaping the full bene￿ts from trade.
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Figure 1: Determination of the Equilibrium Cutoﬀ ϕ∗ and Average Pro￿tﬂ π
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Figure 3: The reallocation of market shares and pro￿ts.
33Appendix
A Aggregation Conditions in the Closed Economy
Using the de￿nition of ￿ ϕ in (7), the aggregation conditions relating the aggregate variables to the

























= M1/ρ q(￿ ϕ),















































B Closed Economy Equilibrium
Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoﬀ Level ϕ∗
Following is a proof that the FE condition, ﬂ π =
δfe
1−G(ϕ∗), and ZCP condition, ﬂ π = fk(ϕ∗), in (12)
identify a unique cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ and that the ZCP curve cuts the FE curve from above in (ϕ,π)
space. I do this by showing that [1 − G(ϕ)]k(ϕ) is monotonically decreasing from in￿nity to zero













































j(ϕ)=[ 1− G(ϕ)]k(ϕ). (B.2)




(σ − 1)[1 − G(ϕ)][k(ϕ)+1 ]< 0, (B.3)
j0(ϕ)ϕ
j(ϕ)






< −(σ − 1). (B.4)
Since j(ϕ) is non-negative and its elasticity with respect to ϕ is negative and bounded away from
zero, j(ϕ)m u s tb ed e c r e a s i n gt oz e r oa sϕ goes to in￿nity. Furthermore, limϕ→0 j(ϕ)=∞ since
limϕ→0 k(ϕ)=∞. Therefore, j(ϕ)=[ 1− G(ϕ)]k(ϕ)d e c r e a s e sf r o mi n ￿nity to zero on (0,∞).
Comparative Statics
Several of the comparative statics will use the property that welfare per worker can be written as
af u n c t i o no fo n l yt h ec u t o ﬀ level ϕ∗:42
W = M
1









Note that the property that welfare decreases with a rise in the entry cost fe is then immediately
obtained as it was shown that ϕ∗ decreases in that situation. The direction of the welfare change
induced by a rise in the overhead production cost is not immediately obvious as f enters into the




















σ−1 ϕ∗, or alternatively, on





f Decreases when f Increases
The FE and ZCP equilibrium conditions for ϕ∗ imply ﬂ π = fk (ϕ∗)=
δfe
1−G(ϕ∗),a n dt h u s
fj (ϕ∗)=δfe, (B.6)














using (B.4). The diﬀerential change in
(ϕ∗)σ−1





















f decreases when f increases. An increase in f therefore generates a welfare loss.
C Open Economy Equilibrium
Aggregate Labor Resources Used to Cover the Export Costs
It was asserted in note 25 that the ratio of new exporters to all exporters was δ, and hence that
the aggregate labor resources used to cover the export cost did not depend on its representation
as either a one time sunk entry cost or a per-period ￿xed cost. As before, let Me denote the





This ratio must be equal to δ as the aggregate stability condition for the equilibrium ensures that
pinMe = δM.
Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoﬀ Level ϕ∗
Following is a proof that the FE condition, ﬂ π =
δfe
1−G(ϕ∗), and the new ZCP condition, ﬂ π = fk(ϕ∗)+
pxnfxk(ϕ∗
x), in (21) identify a unique cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ and that the new ZCP curve cuts the FE curve
A-3from above in (ϕ,π) space. These conditions imply
δfe










σ−1 ϕ∗ is implicitly de￿ned as a function of ϕ∗ (see (20)). Since j(ϕ) is decreasing
from in￿nity to zero on (0,∞), the left hand side in (C.1) must also monotonically decrease from
in￿nity to zero on (0,∞). Therefore, (C.1) identi￿es a unique cutoﬀ level ϕ∗ and the new ZCP
c u r v em u s tc u tt h eF Ec u r v ef r o ma b o v e .
D The Impact of Trade
Welfare




























Since ϕ∗ > ϕ∗
a, welfare in the open economy must be higher than in autarky: W>W a.
Reallocations










σf (∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗





σf (∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗)
in the open economy equilibrium. This immediately yields rd(ϕ) <r a(ϕ)s i n c eϕ∗ > ϕ∗
a.T h es e c -
ond inequality is a direct consequence of another comparative static involving τ.I t i s s h o w n i n
a following section that (1 + nτ1−σ)rd(ϕ) decreases as τ increases. Since the autarky equilib-
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It was pointed out in the paper that aggregate productivity ￿ ϕt in the open economy may not be
higher than ￿ ϕa due to the eﬀect of the output loss incurred in export transit. It was then claimed
that a productivity average based on a measure of output ￿at the factory gate￿ would always be










as such an average where h(.) is any increasing function. The only condition imposed on this average





represent this productivity average in autarky. Then Φ must be greater than Φa ￿ for any increas-
ing function h(.) ￿ as the distribution
r(ϕ)g(ϕ)




o r(ξ)g(ξ) dξ ≤
R ϕ
o ra(ξ)g(ξ) dξ ∀ϕ (and the inequality is strict ∀ϕ > ϕ∗
a).45
E The Impact of Trade Liberalization
Changes in the cutoﬀ levels
These comparative statics are all derived from the equilibrium condition for the cutoﬀ levels (C.1)
and the implicit de￿nition of ϕ∗
x as a function of ϕ∗ in (20).
Increase in n




















∂n > 0a n d
∂ϕ∗
x
∂n > 0s i n c ej0(ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ (see (B.4)).
Decrease in τ
























44This is the standard way of computing industry productivity averages in empirical work.
45This result is a direct consequence of the marker share re-allocation result.
A-5Hence
∂ϕ∗




























































σ−1 ϕ∗.W e l f a r e m u s t
therefore rise with increases in n and decreases in fx or τ since all of these changes induce an
increase in the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗.






σf (∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗) in the new open economy equilibrium. rd(ϕ)t h e r e f o r e
decreases with increases in n and decreases in fx or τ since all of these changes induce an increase
in the cutoﬀ productivity level ϕ∗.T h u s r0
d(ϕ) <r d(ϕ) ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ whenever n0 >n ,τ0 < τ, or
f0
x <f x (since ϕ∗0 > ϕ∗).




will depend on the direction of the change in 1+nτ1−σ
(ϕ∗)σ−1 . It is therefore clear that a ￿rm￿s combined
sales will decrease in the same proportion as its domestic sales when fx decreases since 1 +nτ1−σ
will remain constant. On the other hand, it is now shown that these combined sales will increase
when n increases or τ decreases as 1+nτ1−σ











































































































ϕ∗ ξσ−1 g(ξ) dξ
R ∞
ϕ∗




























ϕ∗ ξσ−1 g(ξ) dξ
R ∞
ϕ∗







































All surviving ￿rms who do not export (with ϕ < ϕ∗0
x ) must incur a pro￿tl o s ss i n c et h e i rp r o ￿ts
from domestic sales decrease (r0
d(ϕ) <r d(ϕ)) and those who would have exported previously (with
the lower n) further lose any pro￿ts from exporting. Similarly, the ￿rm with productivity level
ϕ = ϕ∗0
x also incurs a pro￿t loss (although the ￿rm exports, it gains zero additional pro￿ts from
doing so and still incurs the loss in domestic pro￿ts). The pro￿t change for all exporting ￿rms
(with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗0


















− (n0 − n)fx.




As was the case with the increase in n, the least productive ￿rms who do not export (with ϕ < ϕ∗0
x )
incur both a revenue and pro￿t loss. There now exists a new category of ￿rms with intermediate
productivity levels (ϕ∗0
x ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗
x) who enter the export markets as a consequence of the decrease
in τ. The new export sales generate an increase in revenue for all these ￿rms, but only a portion
of these ￿rms (with productivity ϕ > ϕ￿ where ϕ∗0
x < ϕ￿ < ϕ∗
x) also increase their pro￿ts. Firms
47 1+n0 τ1−σ
(ϕ∗0)σ−1 − 1+n τ1−σ
(ϕ∗)σ−1 must be positive as 1+n τ1−σ
(ϕ∗)σ−1 increases with n.
A-8with productivity levels ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
x who export both before and after the change in τ enjoy a pro￿t
increase that is proportional to their combined revenue increase (their ￿xed costs do not change)


















where the term in the bracket must be positive.
Changes in Aggregate Productivity
Any productivity average based on (D.2) must increase when n increases or τ decreases as the
new distribution of ￿rm revenues
r0(ϕ)g(ϕ)




o r0(ξ)g(ξ) dξ ≤
R ϕ
o r(ξ)g(ξ) dξ ∀ϕ.48 Note that this property does not hold when fx decreases
as the revenues of the most productive ￿rms are not higher with the lower fx. Nevertheless, the
productivity average Φ will rise when fx decreases so long as the new exporters are more productive
than the average (ϕ∗
x > Φ).
48Again, this is a direct consequence of the market share re-allocations results.
A-9